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This lecture reviews some recent developments in monetary theory, mone-
tary policy and the design of institutions for conducting monetary policy. I
hope to convey the following messages: (1) Monetary theory is a thriving and
exciting area of research (2) Monetary policy is, conceptually, institutionally
and practically, a small but signi￿cant part of intertemporal public ￿nance
- its liquid corner. Central bank operational independence and other insti-
tutional arrangements and ongoing developments relevant to the conduct of
monetary policy should not blind one to the fundamental truth that mone-
tary policy is but one component of the ￿scal-￿nancial-monetary programme
of the state - the sovereign. Fundamentally, there can be no such thing
as an independent central bank. For the central bank to perform well, it
needs to be backed by and backed up by an e⁄ective ￿scal authority. In this
relationship, the central bank is, inevitably, the junior partner.
As regards the subtitle of this lecture, the two ghosts are the venerable liq-
uidity trap and the Pigou e⁄ect (or real balance e⁄ect). Both have resurfaced
as issues to be studied by monetary theorists and macroeconometricians, and
as policy concerns for central bankers facing a de￿ ationary environment and
the threat or reality of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. The
two eccentricities are negative nominal interest rates and the theoretical ra-
tionale for and practical modalities of performing Milton Friedman￿ s heli-
copter drop of irredeemable base money. These two unconventional policies
can stimulate consumer demand even when nominal interest rates, short and
long, present and future, are all at their zero lower bounds and Svensson￿ s
1[43] ￿ foolproof￿methods fail.
The fallacy is the so-called Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), an
unconventional theory of the link between the government budget and the
general price level that became popular in the 1990s. Its basic theoretical ￿ aw
- treating the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint as an equilibrium
condition that determines the general price level rather than a relationship
that has to hold identically - results generically (and not surprisingly) in an
ill-posed equilibrium, even in the canonical FTPL setting, when government
pegs the nominal interest rate. Because important links exist, in well-posed
dynamic monetary general equilibrium models, between the government￿ s
￿scal-￿nancial-monetary programme (FFMP) and the dynamics of the price
level and the real value of the public debt, and because some of the in￿ uence
of the FTPL may still linger, it makes sense to use the opportunity provided
by this Hahn lecture to perform a post-mortem on the FTPL and extol the
virtues of the CTPL - the consistent, coherent and conventional theory of the
price level. This rejection of the FTPL is not a matter of ￿ de gustibus...￿ or
an empirical issue. It is a matter of logical coherence and consistency.
The mirage is the vision of the future of government ￿at money and
monetary policy which holds that a combination of ￿nancial deregulation and
technical change in the payments and settlements technologies (electronic
funds transfer, e-money, cash-on-a chip etc.) will cause monetary policy
to lose its capacity to in￿ uence nominal, let alone real economic variables.
This view fails to appreciate the unique capacity of the state to provide
unquestioned and unlimited liquidity (through its monopoly of the power to
tax, regulate and endow some of its liabilities with legal tender status) when,
2because of systemic risk and uncertainty, the private provision of liquidity
dries up.
Finally, the mythos refers to the theoretical rationale for and institutional
implementation of central bank independence. The word mythos￿is applica-
ble in all its senses, from a ￿ctitious story, ￿ction or half-truth, through a
popular belief to the pattern of basic values and attitudes of a people. Al-
though, fundamentally, there can be no such thing as independence for the
central bank, the institutional arrangements and operating characteristics
now commonly grouped together under the ￿ operational independence￿label
have by and large been helpful in delivering better monetary policies than
most practical alternatives. However, misinterpretation of the meaning of
independence for central banks can lead to policy con￿ ict, poorly designed
and executed monetary and ￿scal policies and to ￿nancial instability.
2 A monetary general equilibrium model
Consider a closed endowment economy with a single perishable commodity.
Every period t ￿ 1 each household receives an exogenous endowment yt > 0;
pays net lump-sum taxes ￿t; and consumes ct ￿ 0: There are three ￿nan-
cial claims, ￿at base money, one-period nominal bonds and one-period real
bonds. The actual quantities outstanding at the end of period t and car-
ried into period t + 1 are, respectively, Mt; Bt and dt: Quantities demanded
by households have a superscript p; quantities supplied by the government
have a superscript g: Also mt ￿ Mt=Pt and bt ￿ Bt=Pt: Money held from
period t to t + 1 bears a risk-free nominal interest rate iM
t+1 > ￿1: The
3risk-free nominal and real interest rates on non-monetary ￿nancial instru-
ments (nominal, respectively real bonds) held from period t to t + 1 are
it+1 > ￿1; respectively rt+1 > ￿1: The period t money price of the com-
modity is Pt ￿ 0: Total non-monetary contractual debt of the government
outstanding at the beginning period t+1 (including interest due) is denoted
Ft+1 ￿ (1 + it+1)Bt + Pt+1(1 + rt+1)dt and ft+1 ￿ Ft+1=Pt+1:
Households strictly observe all contractual obligations vis-￿-vis other house-
holds. The government, however, can ￿ override￿its outstanding (predeter-
mined) contractual ￿nancial obligations vis-￿-vis the private sector. With-
out this a⁄ecting the substance of anything that follows, we also assume that
the government always honours its monetary contractual obligations. The
government also always implements its public spending and tax programme.
If the government does not honour its contractual debt obligations at the
beginning of period t+1; all outstanding debt has equal seniority, that is, all
resources available for debt service are pro-rated equally over all outstanding
non-monetary contractual debt: the government, in period t + 1 will pay
Vt+1Ft+1 on its outstanding non-monetary debt. If 0 ￿ Vt+1 < 1, then Vt+1
has the interpretation of a government debt default discount factor - the
fraction of the contractual payments due in period t+1 that is actually paid.
We may also wish to consider Vt+1 > 1 (a government debt super-solvency
premium). and Vt+1 < 0 (the government￿ s contractual debt is revalued into
an e⁄ective credit, or vice versa). To make sense of these last two possibilities,
public debt would have to viewed as equity (without limited liability, if we
permit Vt+1 < 0); in the present discounted value of the future primary
surpluses (including seigniorage) of the government. To encompass all these
4cases, I refer to Vt+1 as the public debt revaluation factor in period t + 1:
Households take Vt+1 as given.
Nominal e⁄ective non-monetary debt at the beginning of period t + 1 is
Vt+1Ft+1; real e⁄ective non-monetary debt is Vt+1ft+1: Total e⁄ective mone-
tary and non-monetary contractual obligations of the government (including
interest due) at the beginning of period t+1 are denoted At+1 ￿ (1+iM
t+1)Mt+





t ;Mt ￿ 0:
2.1 Households
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= 1 + it+1; t ￿ 1 (1)






















￿1 t1 ￿ t0; Rt0;t0￿1 ￿ 1:
The following assumption is crucial:
Assumption 1: Base money is perceived to be an asset by each individ-
ual household. Households believe they can always realise this asset in any
period, including the in￿nitely distant future, at the prevailing market price
of money.
The household solvency constraint is accordingly that the present dis-






N ￿ 0: (3)
In each period, t, the household maximises the utility function given
in (4), subject to (2) and (3), taking as given that period￿ s public debt
revaluation factor Vt and the initial contractual ￿nancial asset stocks Mt￿1 =









j); ￿ > 0; cj; m
p
j ￿ 0 (4)
The period felicity function is increasing in consumption and end-of-
period real money balances, strictly concave, twice continuously di⁄erentiable
and satis￿es the Inada conditions for consumption and real money balances.






























N = 0 (7)
Because uc > 0 for bounded values of c; equations (7) and (5) imply
that the household solvency constraint (3) will hold with equality. This
means that we can solve (3) and (2) for the household intertemporal budget































For expositional simplicity, I will assume in most of what follows that the
period felicity function takes the following form.
u(ct;m
p
t) = (1 ￿ ￿)lnct + ￿m
p
t; 0 < ￿ < 1 (9)
A drawback of this speci￿cation is that there no satiation in real money
balances at a ￿nite stock of real money balances.1
1Indeed, utility increases in real money balances without bound.
72.2 Government
The government￿ s period budget identity is given in (10). Real public spend-
ing on goods and services is denoted g: ￿ Government￿refers to the consoli-
dated central bank and general government, that is, it refers to the state or
the sovereign as a whole.
M
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Pt is the real value of period t seigniorage income
(the real value of net new base money issuance over and above the interest
bill on the outstanding stock of base money). A second key assumption is
the following:
Assumption 2: Base money does not have to be redeemed by the gov-
ernment - ever. It does not represent a claim by the holder on the issuer for
anything other than the same amount of itself.
An implication of Assumption 2 is that the government￿ s solvency con-
straint requires the present discounted value of its non-monetary terminal




















Together, (12) and (11) imply the government￿ s intertemporal budget





















Assumptions 1 and 2 together formalise the monetary folk proposition
that (government ￿at) money is an asset to the private holder but not in any
meaningful sense a liability of the public issuer.
2.2.1 The government￿ s ￿scal-￿nancial-monetary programme
Real government spending on goods and services is constant:
gt = g ￿ 0; t ￿ 1: (14)




M; t ￿ 1 (15)
Two alternative monetary rules are considered.
9(1) A constant growth rate for the nominal money stock:,
M
g
t+1 = (1 + v)M
g
t ; t ￿ 0 (16)
1 + v ￿
1 + iM
1 + ￿
(2) A constant nominal interest rate:
it = i ￿ i
M; t ￿ 1 (17)
Two tax rules are considered.
(1) A simple ￿ Ricardian￿rule that aims to ensure that the GIBC holds
identically, that is, for all feasible values of the variables entering the GIBC,
when the government is committed to contract ful￿llment: The Ricardian tax
rule in (18) has taxes adjusting endogenously or ￿ residually￿to keep constant





t = a0 ; t ￿ 1: This implies the following behaviour
for taxes:








t; t ￿ 1 (18)
(2) A simple ￿ Non-Ricardian￿or overdetermined rule that keeps con-
stant the real value of taxes plus seigniorage each period at some exogenously
given value:
￿t = ￿ ￿ ￿ s
g
t ; t ￿ 1 (19)
According to the CTPL the GIBC always holds identically. Either the
government is committed to contract ful￿llment, that is,
10Vt = 1; t ￿ 1; (20)
in which case it adopts the Ricardian rule (18). Alternatively, it adopts
the (￿ overdetermined￿ ) non-Ricardian rule (19),in which case Vt; t ￿ 1 is
endogenous and Vtft; t ￿ 1 ￿ clears￿the GIBC. Both approaches lead to a
well-posed general equilibrium system.
The FTPL, which leads to ill-posed general equilibrium systems, requires
that the government￿ s intertemporal budget constraint hold only as an equi-
librium condition. It assumes that the (overdetermined) non-Ricardian ￿scal
rule (19) applies, but nevertheless insists on contract ful￿llment (Vt = 1; t ￿
1): According to the FTPL, the government can always satisfy its contrac-
tual debt obligations exactly, despite its overdetermined FFMP, because in
each period, t, the general price level Pt plays the same role revaluing the
government￿ s non-monetary debt, as is played by Vtft in the CTPL (that is,
under the non-Ricardian ￿scal rule without contract ful￿llment).2
2.3 Equilibrium
The private sector and the government have consistent views on and expecta-
tions of current and anticipated future ￿nancial asset stocks, except possibly
"at in￿nity". This is the meaning of equations (21a) to (21d). The potential
asymmetry or discrepancy between the public and private sectors￿views on
2In a world without uncertainty or in a world with uncertainty and complete contingent
markets, the requirement that contracts be ful￿lled exactly does not pose problems. Let
￿t be the set of states of nature in period t: Then in every period t; V!t = 1 8!t 2 ￿t: In
a world with uncertainty but incomplete markets, weaker requirements such as expected
contract ful￿llment would have to be introduced.
11the present discounted value of terminal ￿at money balances cannot be ver-
i￿ed and resolved, since it involves the behaviour of the money stock in the










t = ft ; t ￿ 0 (21b)
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The endowment is exogenous and constant, yt = y￿ > g ￿ 0: Prices are
￿ exible and the goods market clears each period:
ct = y
￿ ￿ g ; t ￿ 1 (22)
With the separable period felicity function, the equilibrium real interest
rate is constant
rt = ￿ ; t ￿ 1 (23)
With a log-linear period felicity function, monetary equilibrium is given
by:
y










; it+1 ￿ i
M; t ￿ 1 (24)














[￿j ￿ g + sj] ; t ￿ 1
(26)
st ￿
Mt ￿ (1 + iM)Mt￿1
Pt
;t ￿ 1 (27)
M0 = ￿ M0 > 0;B0 = ￿ B0;d0 = ￿ d0;i1 = ￿ {1;r1 = ￿ r1
As pointed out in Section 2.2.1, the CTPL permits two kinds of equilibria.
The ￿rst has contract ful￿llment by the government, that is, (20) holds, and
the Ricardian tax function (18) applies. In equilibrium this tax function can
be written as







￿ ￿ g) ; t ￿ 1: (28)











[￿j ￿ g + sj]: (29)
The second CTPL equilibrium does not impose contract ful￿llment. The
government adopts the non-Ricardian tax function given in (30) and Vt is
13endogenous.
















[￿j ￿ g + sj] =
1 + ￿
￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ g); t ￿ 1:
In the second CTPL equilibrium, Vtft; the e⁄ective real value of the gov-
ernment￿ s net non-monetary debt is ￿ residually￿determined from the GIBC.
Note that the GIBC still holds identically. Also, while Vtft is always uniquely
determined from (31), whether Vt and ft are severally determinate depends
both on the monetary policy regime and on the composition of the outstand-
ing non-monetary ￿nancial liabilities of the government.
Until Section 5, I will assume that the government adopts the Ricardian
￿scal rule with contract ful￿llment.
143 The real balance e⁄ect and the liquidity
trap
The log-linear utility function (9) implies the following consumption function:











Substituting the GIBC (29) into the household consumption function
(32), using the de￿nition of seigniorage (27) and the monetary equilibrium
condition (24), we obtain the consumption function "after consolidation of















It is well-known that a representative agent model necessarily exhibits
debt neutrality or Ricardian equivalence: government non-monetary debt is
not net wealth. Philippe Weil [44] pointed out that in the representative
agent model ￿at government money would not be net wealth either. His




j=t Rt+1;j(yj ￿ gj): With
symmetric household and government solvency constraints, there is no real
balance e⁄ect or Pigou e⁄ect on private consumption. Monetary policy does
not work through any wealth e⁄ect. It can only a⁄ect real consumption
if it changes the present value of future endowments (holding constant the
sequence of current and future real government spending). It can do so either
15by changing current and future real interest rates, and thus the real discount
factors, or by somehow changing the sequence of current and future real
endowments.3
With irredeemable government ￿at money, base money is net wealth in
the sense that the present discounted value of the terminal stock of money
balances is part of the private sector￿ s comprehensive wealth after consoli-
dation of the HIBC and GIBC. Thus, there exists a weak form of the real
balance e⁄ect even in the representative agent model with rational expecta-
tions.
A helicopter drop of money in period t is an increase in the period t
stock of nominal base money brought about by a reduction in period t taxes.
There is a pure wealth e⁄ect of monetary policy on consumption demand
if changes in the sequence of current and future nominal money stocks can
change consumption demand, holding constant the initial price level, initial
￿nancial asset stocks, the sequences of current and future nominal and real
interest rates, real government spending, and endowments. It follows from
a comparison of equations (32) and (33) that there is a pure wealth e⁄ect of
monetary policy only if monetary policy can in￿ uence P
￿1
t limN!1 It+1;N(1+
iM)MN￿1: For this to be possible, the government must be able to change,
through the issuance of money, the present discounted value of current and
future taxes. Because of debt neutrality, when the government continues to
satisfy its solvency constraint, postponing taxes by borrowing does not a⁄ect
their present discounted value. Postponing taxes by issuing money can a⁄ect
3In more general models, the marginal propensity to consume out of comprehensive
wealth, which is
￿
1+￿ in the model considered here, will be a function of current and future
real and nominal interest rates as well.
16the present discounted value of current and future taxes if and only if this
can in￿ uence P
￿1
t limN!1 It+1;N(1 + iM)MN￿1: Because of debt neutrality,
a helicopter drop of money in period t; ￿nanced by a period t tax cut (the
benchmark) has the same e⁄ect as one ￿nanced by the purchase of bonds in
period t; with taxes in period t + 1 and/or later cut by the same amount in
present value as the period t tax cut in the benchmark. Helicopter drops
of money and open market purchases are equivalent when the government
satis￿es its solvency constraint identically in both scenarios.
The equilibrium behaviour of the stock of real money balances under a
constant growth rate of the nominal stock of money (equation (16)) is given
by
mt+1 =
















This has two steady state equilibria, the barter equilibrium ￿ m = 0; which






(1 + ￿)(1 + v)
(1 + ￿)(1 + v) ￿ (1 + iM)
￿
(y




(1+￿)￿1; the steady state (35) is unstable. Any
initial value of the real money stock below
=
m cannot be part of an equilibrium
sequence because the real stock of money balances would become negative
(in￿ ationary bubbles are therefore ruled out). Any initial value of the real
money stock above
=
m cannot be an equilibrium because the real value of
17the stock of money balances would increase without bound. Its proportional
growth rate would in the long run converge to
(1+￿)(1+v)
1+iM ￿1 and the nominal
interest rate to iM: With the real interest rate equal to ￿; the present value of
the terminal stock of real money balances would grow without bound. From
the consumption function in (33), this would violate the economy-wide real
resource constraint.
Thus the only equilibrium (other than the barter equilibrium) is the sta-
tionary equilibrium (34). The result, which can be found in Buiter and
Sibert [12] for more general utility functions, that de￿ ationary bubbles don￿ t
exist, even when the government issues both money and bonds, is new and
depends crucially on the assumption that money is irredeemable. Without
that, de￿ ationary bubbles would exist if the government issues both monetary
and non-monetary liabilities and has an appropriate FFMP, such as the one
given in equations (16), (20) and (18) (see Woodford [50]). Since our tax rule
keeps constant the real value of money plus bonds - the only state variable
in the household￿ s optimisation programme - the unbounded increase in the
real value of the stock of money would be balanced by an unbounded increase
in the negative value of the real non-monetary debt. This is no longer true
when money is irredeemable and the term P
￿1
t limN!1 It+1;N(1 + iM)MN￿1
is present in the consumption function (33).4
De￿nition 1 A liquidity trap is an equilibrium in which all current and
future short nominal interest rates are at their lower bounds, that is, an
4An equivalent statement of the non-existence of a de￿ ationary bubbles equilibrium
can be made by showing how this would cause the transversality condition (7) to hold
only if uc = 0; which would violate the economy-wide real resource constraint c + g ￿ y￿:
18economy is in a liquidity trap at time t0 ￿ 1; if it = iM
t , t ￿ t0.5
This is a rather more restrictive de￿nition than is used by Svensson in
[43]. His de￿nition of a liquidity trap only requires that the current short
nominal rate be at its lower bound. It is therefore not surprising, that
Svensson￿ s ￿ foolproof￿method for avoiding liquidity traps or escaping from
them, does not work when the economy is stuck in the rather more severe
liquidity trap considered here.
When 1 + v =
￿
1 + iM￿
(1 + ￿)￿1 the unique non-barter stationary equi-
librium is Friedman￿ s optimum quantity of money (OQM) equilibrium, with
it = iM and 1 + ￿t = 1 + v: With the log-linear period felicity function in
(9), the stock of real money balances goes to in￿nity when i approaches iM;
as is apparent from (24). This is awkward but does not a⁄ect the argument
about how the weak real balance e⁄ect associated with the irredeemability of
money rules out de￿ ationary bubbles and indeed all liquidity trap equilibria
other than Friedman￿ s OQM steady state.
In equilibrium, the consumption function (33) becomes
ct = y








M)MN￿1 ;t ￿ 1 (36)
Together with the commodity market equilibrium condition (22), (36)
5If there were longer maturity nominal bonds, the de￿nition of a liquidity trap would
require that the risk-free nominal interest rates on bonds of all maturities be at their
lower bounds. In the simple formal model of this paper, with has no uncertainty, longer-
maturity rates can be derived from current and (anticipated) future short nominal rates
through the expectations hypothesis.






M)MN￿1 = 0 ;t ￿ 1 (37)
Condition (37) suggest some simple characteristics that a monetary rule
should have to rule out liquidity trap equilibria other than Friedman￿ s OQM
equilibrium. Consider the following rule:
1 + v =
1 + iM
1 + ￿
if ￿t+1 = ￿t (38)
￿ 1 + i
M otherwise. (39)
The ￿rst part of the monetary rule, (38), supports Friedman￿ s station-
ary OQM equilibrium. The second part, (39), ensures no other liquidity
trap equilibrium exists. This is most easily shown by assuming the con-
trary. If a liquidity trap equilibrium exists, starting in period t0 ￿ 1;
then 1
Pt limN!1 It+1;N(1 + iM)MN￿1 = 1











￿N￿1 for all t ￿ t0:





￿N￿1 = 0 only if Mt
Pt = 0. Since by
assumption it = iM; it follows that Mt
Pt = +1 > 0:6
In the conventional benchmark (iM = 0) it follows that liquidity trap
equilibria are ruled out as long as the authorities are believed not to de-
monetise the economy (reduce the undiscounted nominal stock of base money
6All that is required is that the demand for real money balances is positive when the
pecuniary opportunity cost of holding money is zero. An in￿nite demand for real money
balances when i = iM is not necessary.
20to zero) in the long run.7 Essentially the same result holds when the economy
has nominal price rigidities. The Phillips curve in equation (40) provides two
examples. Output is demand-determined: y = c + g and ￿t ￿ Pt=Pt￿1:
￿t+1 = ￿t + ￿0 ￿ ￿1(y




The New-Keynesian version has ￿0; ￿1 > 0:The price level P; is predeter-
mined but the rate of in￿ ation ￿ is not. Equation (40) solves for the current
rate of in￿ ation as an increasing function of current and (anticipated) future
output gaps, plus the long-run rate of in￿ ation. The Old-Keynesian version
has ￿0; ￿1 < 0: Both the price level and the rate of in￿ ation are predeter-
mined. Equation (40) solves for the current in￿ ation rate as an increasing
function of past output gaps plus the initial rate of in￿ ation. Under both
interpretations, actual output cannot exceed a ￿nite maximum level given
by ￿ y = y￿ + ￿1￿
￿1
0 : A su¢ ciently large value for the undiscounted terminal
stock of base money will rule out liquidity trap equilibria. Any growth rate of
the nominal money stock higher than the interest rate on money is su¢ cient
but not necessary for that. When the interest rate on money is zero, any
positive growth rate of the nominal money stock will, if it is expected to be
maintained in the long run, rule out liquidity trap equilibria.
It is the expected behaviour of the long-run stock of base money that
matters. If despite a record by authorities of current and past positive growth
of the nominal money stock, the private sector expects that, in the long run,
any current and past money stock increases will be reversed, the economy
7In Friedman￿ s OQM equilibrium, the nominal stock of money balances goes to zero in
the long run when iM = 0:
21could be stuck on a liquidity trap solution trajectory for as long as these
incorrect but irrefutable expectations persist.8
4 Negative nominal interest rates
Why did we not see negative nominal interest rates in Japan during the years
2000-2003? The short answer is that the risk-free short nominal interest rate
on non-monetary ￿nancial instruments (nominal bonds) is bounded from be-
low by the nominal interest rate on base money. Since currency has a zero
nominal interest rate, the nominal interest rate on bonds cannot be nega-
tive. The slightly longer answer is that base money consists of currency and
commercial bank reserves with the central bank. Let the nominal interest
rate on currency be iC, the nominal interest rate on bank reserves iR; the
carry cost of bonds ￿; the carry cost of currency ￿C and the carry cost of
bank reserves ￿R If both currency and base money have superior liquidity to
bonds, the following equality must hold:9








The storage and security costs of holding currency in large amounts are
high, so ￿C > ￿ ￿ ￿R ￿ 0: The nominal interest rate on bank reserves with
the central bank can be anything, positive or negative. These are balances
8The expectations are irrefutable because they relate to the behaviour of the nominal
money stock in the in￿nitely distant future. The expression incorrect but irrefutable (IBI)
expectations is due to Anne Sibert.
9iC reprsents the pecuniary returns on currency to honest folk. The criminal uses of
currency bestow on it an often much higher risk-adjusted expected rate of return than
is available (for the criminal) on less anonymous investments with higher conventional
pecuniary rates of return.
22in electronic ledgers. The creditor (the central bank) knows exactly the size
of the balances held at each instant by the debtors (the commercial banks).
When you know the legal identity of the owner and how much he holds at
each instant, paying interest, positive or negative, is trivially simple. The
binding constraint on the nominal interest rate is therefore the interest rate




Since the interest rate on currency is zero, the interest rate on bonds
can only be negative by the margin permitted by the (high) carry costs of
currency. That may not be enough for monetary policy purposes during a
sharply de￿ ationary episode.
The reason currency does not pay interest, positive or negative, is that
it is administratively costly so to do. Currency is a negotiable bearer bond.
The holder (owner) is anonymous. Because the issuer does not know the
identity of the bearer, it must be possible to identify for each particular unit
of the monetary instrument (currency notes) whether interest due has been
paid or received. This is necessary both to prevent a given note from being
presented repeatedly for the payment of (positive) interest or to induce the
anonymous owner to come forward and pay any interest due to the issuer
(in the case of negative interest). Notes have to be stamped or marked,
the way old-fashioned positive interest-bearing bearer bonds coupons were
clipped when interest was paid. The idea of taxing currency in this way
goes back at least to Gesell [22], was supported by Irving Fisher [18] and has
23recently been revived by Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [10], [11] and Goodfriend
[23].
There is no doubt that imposing a carry tax on currency would be ad-
ministratively cumbersome - it would require, for instance, su¢ ciently heavy
penalties for using unstamped, interest-overdue currency to induce holders
of currency to come forward and pay the tax. These costs have to be set
against the cost of being stuck at the zero bound or the cost of pursuing
policies that would make it unlikely that the zero bound could become a
binding constraint - a higher (target) rate of in￿ ation.10
5 The fallacy of the Fiscal Theory of the Price
Level
The main theme of this lecture is that monetary policy is part of intertempo-
ral public ￿nance. However, not every theory asserting a strong link between
the government budget and the price level makes sense, as is evident from the
rise and fall of the so-called "Fiscal Theory of the Price level", a theory ￿rst
proposed in the 1980s (see Begg and Haque [4]), which gained prominence
during the 1990s (see Sims [39], [40], [41], [42], Woodford [45], [46], [47], [48],
[49], [50], Cochrane [13], [14], [15] and Kocherlakota, Narayana and Phelan
[27]). The FTPL was shown to be a fallacy in Buiter [7] and Niepelt [32] (see
also McCallum [29], and Benassy [5]). The key assumption of the FTPL is
that, when the nominal interest rate is set exogenously (or as a function of
10 If the zero nominal interest rate on currency were really the only obstacle to setting
negative nominal interest rates, that would represent a powerful motive for getting rid of
currency completely (see also Section 6).
24real variables only), the GIBC does not have to hold identically but only in
equilibrium. This assumption is unacceptable because it denies the single
most important de￿ning characteristic of a market economy: hard budget
constraints based on clearly de￿ned property rights, backed up with default
penalties in case of non-observance. Not surprisingly, the FTPL, a theory
based on turning an identity into an equilibrium condition, has a large num-
ber of anomalous and inconsistent implications. A theory is only as good
as the sum total of its implications. That makes the FTPL a spectacular
monetary theory erratum and corrigendum.
In the eight Subsections of Section 5 that follow, I outline a few of the
more notable anomalies and inconsistencies implied by the FTPL. Before
turning to these, however, it is important to bring out the intrinsic enormity
of confusing the roles of equilibrium conditions and identities in general equi-
librium models, including the dynamic monetary general equilibrium models
under consideration here.
The budget constraint is a fundamental building block of any market
economy. It is the requirement that an agent￿ s ￿nancial plan be internally
consistent or coherent: the sum of all planned uses of funds should not exceed
the sum of all planned or expected sources of funds. In dynamic macroeco-
nomic models, two kinds of uses and sources of funds can be distinguished:
contractual and discretionary. Contractual uses (sources) of funds in any pe-
riod t are predetermined payments to be made (received) on ￿nancial instru-
ments inherited from period t￿1: Failure to meet such contractual obligations
in the case of a debtor mean default and possible bankruptcy, intervention
by the courts and legal or other sanctions. Discretionary uses and sources of
25funds are payments and receipts that can be freely chosen in period t+1: Pe-
riod t private and public consumption, endowments, taxes and purchases or
sales of ￿nancial instruments fall into that category. The budget constraint
of an agent implies that not all discretionary uses and sources of funds can be
speci￿ed independently if he is committed always to ful￿ll his contractual ￿-
nancial obligations. It also implies that, if all discretionary uses and sources
of funds are speci￿ed independently (without regard to his outstanding con-
tractual obligations), the economic agent will not, in general, be able to meet
his outstanding contractual ￿nancial obligations. The budget constraint then
implies that if the agent sticks to (implements) his plan for all discretionary
uses and sources of funds, the outstanding (predetermined) contractual ￿-
nancial obligations will have to be overwritten and revalued (or re-priced)
for the planned discretionary uses and sources of funds to be feasible.
A familiar example is non-performing debt which is priced at a discount
from its notional value because the present value of current and future ex-
pected debt service is less that the debt￿ s notional or contractual value. The
CTPL asserts that the budget constraint applies in the same way to all
economic agents. It applies when the agent is small (say, a price-taking
consumer or competitive ￿rm) or large (say a monopolist or a government
that recognises its market power). It applies to the private sector and to
the government. The government has some unique sources of funds at its
disposal: it has to power to tax (which is a legal monopoly) and the ability
to assert a monopoly over the issuance of negotiable bearer notes (cash) and
to attach special privileges (such as legal tender status) to that ￿nancial in-
strument. However, even a large economic agent with two unique sources of
26funds is subject to the requirement that the sum of all planned discretionary
uses of funds cannot exceed the sum of all expected discretionary sources of
funds, if outstanding contractual commitments are to be met.
The CTPL allows for the possibility that the government may not be
able to, and may not even plan to, meet its contractual debt obligations.
An overdetermined FFMP is possible. An example is the Non-Ricardian
tax policy where (19) holds instead of (18): real spending and real taxes
plus seiniorage are speci￿ed exogenously for all time, without any reference
to the government￿ s outstanding stock of debt obligations. In that case,
from the perspective of the CTPL, (20) no longer applies, the budget con-
straint becomes ￿ soft￿ , and Vtft becomes an endogenous variable, revaluing
the government￿ s outstanding contractual obligations to bring consistency to
the FFMP. The government ￿ s intertemporal budget constraint becomes an
e⁄ective real public debt pricing kernel.11
The interpretation of Vt < 0 and ft > 0 is that the government imposes,
at the very beginning of period t, a capital levy (not included in ￿ ￿) which
allows it to pay o⁄ the outstanding contractual public debt and have some
resources left to achieve a net credit position vis ￿ vis the private sector.12 If
this argument does not convince, we must conclude that, if the GIBC with
11Since Vt+1ft+1 = (1+rt+1)Vtft + ￿ g ￿ ￿ ￿ under the non-Ricardian rule, if Vtft > 0 and
￿ g ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0; the growth rate of the e⁄ective real debt would exceed the real interest rate
each period. The governments solvency constraint (12) would be violated. If Vtft < 0 and
￿ g￿￿ ￿ < 0; the growth rate of the real e⁄ective stock of government net non-monetary credit
would exceed the real interest rate each period, so in equilibrium the household￿ s solvency
constraint (3) would be violated. However, if we permit Vt < 0; then sgnfVtftg = sgn
f￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ gg says nothing about the relationship between sgnfftg and sgnf￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ gg:
12The interpretation of Vt < 0 and ft < 0 is that the contractualy net creditor gov-
ernment makes, at the very beginning of period t, a capital transfer (or gift) (again not
included in ￿ ￿) which allows the private sector to pay o⁄ its outstanding contractual debt
to the government and have some resources left to extend net credit to the public sector.
27the non-Ricardian ￿scal rule and the overdetermined FFMP can be satis￿ed
only with a negative value of Vt; then no equilibrium exists.
Whether a positive value of Vt greater than one is acceptable, depends
on how far one is willing to push the view that government debt is equity
in the stream of current and future primary surpluses and seigniorage. The
conventional view is that debt is equity without the upside: debt may sell
for less than its contractual value, but it cannot sell for more: 0 ￿ Vt ￿ 1:
If public debt is viewed as true equity, with an upside as well as a downside,
Vt > 1 would be acceptable. When ft > 0; Vt > 1 can be interpreted as
an extraordinary dividend paid to the private bond holders. If we insist on
Vt ￿ 1 but the solution for Vt from the GIBC gives Vt > 1; we must ￿nd
some other way to determine how the government disposes of the excess of
the present value of its current and future primary surpluses plus seigniorage
over the contractual value of its outstanding debt. Otherwise no equilibrium
exists in this case either. This is an open issue.
The FTPL asserts that it is possible to have an overdetermined FFMP
(e.g. the Non-Ricardian tax rule in (19)) but still to require that the govern-
ment meets its ￿nancial obligations exactly, that is, (20) holds. What makes
this possible, according to the FTPL, is that the general price level Pt plays
the role played by Vtft in the CTPL. In my simple model, the period t GIBC
alone determines the general price level.
285.1 I could not have started from here
Niepelt [32] makes the point that the combination of a non-zero predeter-
mined, outstanding stock of nominal government debt and a non-Ricardian
FFMP could not be the outcome of an equilibrium process. How did the
household that holds Bt￿1 at the beginning of period t come to choose that
stock of nominal contractual debt obligations in earlier periods? In a rational
expectations equilibrium a household￿ s willingness to take on nominal debt in
period t￿1 is contingent on that debt earning the appropriate (risk-adjusted)
real rate of return between periods t ￿ 1 and t: In our simple model, this is
re￿ ected in the condition that 1 + rt+1 = (1 + it+1)
Pt+1
Pt for all t ￿ 1:
The FTPL determines the initial value of the general price level from









(￿ ￿ ￿ g): (43)
Niepelt asserts that we cannot simply assume that in the initial period, t = 1;
there is a positive stock of nominal government bonds outstanding, B0 >
0:13 We have to be able to explain the initial stock of government nominal
debt outstanding an equilibrium outcome with rational private saving and
investment behaviour in periods before the initial period.
What this argument amounts to is that,in some ￿ pre-initial period￿ , period
0; say, there was zero nominal government debt outstanding, so the GIBC






(￿ ￿ ￿ g) ￿ (1 + r1)d0 > 0:
29(1 + ￿ r0)￿ d￿1 =
1 + ￿
￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ g): (44)
It is clear that, since both sides of equation (44) are exogenously deter-
mined, the FTPL will, generically, produce an overdetermined equilibrium.
The CTPL, of course, keeps going strong also in this case. Its counterpart
to equation (44) is
V0(1 + ￿ r0)￿ d￿1 =
1 + ￿
￿
(￿ ￿ ￿ g): (45)
With an overdetermined non-Ricardian ￿scal rule, the government will
not, in general, be able to meet its contractual obligations exactly: V0 6= 1.
The GIBC now determines the e⁄ective real value of the non-monetary public
debt V0(1 + ￿ r0)￿ d￿1 through the endogeneity of the public debt revaluation
factor V0:
Niepels is correct that government ￿scal policies must be Ricardian if
the initial stock of nominal government debt is to be rationalisable as the
outcome of a rational expectations equilibrium. I do not share his view that
the initial stock of nominal government debt ought always to be rationalised
this way. I am happy to take the inherited stock of contractual obligations
to be whatever it is - history happened. There are then two ways for the
government to deal with its inherited contractual obligations - and it is ir-
relevant whether these are nominal or real. Either government ￿scal policies
are Ricardian or the non-monetary government debt (real and/or nominal)
is revalued, through an endogenous public debt revaluation factor, Vt to en-
sure that the e⁄ective real value of the government￿ s debt in each period Vtft
30satis￿es the GIBC for that period.
When the authorities ￿x the nominal interest rate sequence exogenously,
the CTPL has nominal indeterminacy, both with the Ricardian and the non-
Ricardian ￿scal rule. All real variables - the real stock of money balances,
the in￿ ation rate, the nominal interest rate and the e⁄ective real value of
the government￿ s non-monetary debt (Vtft in the non￿ Ricardian case) are
uniquely determined, but the nominal money stock and the general price
level are indeterminate. In the non-Ricardian case, if Bt 6= 0; neither the
general price level Pt nor the public debt valuation factor Vt are determinate,
although the variable that matters, Vtft; is uniquely determined as the real
￿ residual claim￿to the future primary surpluses and seigniorage of the state.
The nominal indeterminacy of the conventional model is not a problem or a
weakness. It is simply a re￿ ection of the fact that the authorities have not
provided a nominal anchor for the system.14
Super￿cially, the presence of a positive outstanding stock of non-monetary
nominal public debt plus the assumption that the authorities peg the nominal
interest rate may appear to provide an escape from the real overdeterminacy
that would normally be expected under an (overdetermined) non-Ricardian
￿scal rule when the government is required to honour its contractual obliga-
tions. Closer inspection of the putative FTPL equilibrium and its properties
demonstrates, however, that anomalies and contradictions abound. I will
list a few of the most interesting ones.
14The nominal interest rate (more precisely, the di⁄erence between the nominal interest
rate and the nominal interest rate on base money), is a real variable - the real pecuniary
rate of return di⁄erential between money and bonds.
315.2 Prices clear markets, not budget constraints
Economists think of equilibrium prices as clearing markets, not budget con-
straints. Also, a particular equilibrium is viewed as more interesting and
relevant, if it can be shown to be the outcome of an equilibrating process
that drives prices back to the equilibrium when the equilibrium is perturbed.
Ideally, the ￿ out-of-equilibrium￿ forces driving prices back to equilibrium
would themselves be modeled as part of some more general ￿ meta-equilibrium
model￿ , but the complexity of such an approach is such that Walrasian or
Marshallian t￿tonnement-type adjustment processes taking place in virtual
time rather than calendar time are often resorted to.15 Walrasian t￿ton-
nement, for instance, has a price rising if, at the prevailing level of that
price, there is excess demand. What plausible disequilibrium adjustment
story can one tell if the value of the general price level in period 1; say, is
below the value that equates both sides of the GIBC in equation ([?]) for
t = 1? Why would there be any upward pressure on the general price level
in period 1; simply because at the prevailing value of P1 the real value of
the government￿ s non-monetary debt exceeds the present discounted value of
current and future real primary surpluses plus real seigniorage? This critique
of the FTPL, due to John Sutton, is similar in spirit, although quite di⁄erent
formally, from McCallum￿ s demonstration that the FTPL is not ￿ learnable￿
(see McCallum [31]).
15Walrasian t￿tonnement has a price rising (falling) when there is excess demand (sup-
ply) at the current price. Marshallian t￿tonnement has a quantity rising (falling) when
the damand price exceeds (is below) the supply price
325.3 The HTPL and the ETPL
As regards the valuation of its debt, the government is in a position that
is not fundamentallydi⁄erent from that of any private agent. The conven-
tional household optimisation problem solved in Section 2.1 assumes that
the HIBC holds identically (that is, the household follows a ￿ Ricardian con-
sumption plan￿ ). Instead, we could, by analogy with the FTPL, have any
individual household (or, perhaps a set of households with market power) ￿x
every element in their in￿nite sequences of real consumption fct;t ￿ 1g and






;t ￿ 1g.16 The HIBC,
treated as an equilibrium condition rather than an identity, would then be
turned into a household real debt revaluation equation or household real
debt pricing kernel. If we then insist that the household meet its contrac-
tual debt obligations exactly, we would have the HIBC theory of the price
level or HTPL. In models with private enterprises as well as households,
we could do the same for any enterprise with monopoly power and have the
enterprise budget constraint theory of the price level or ETPL. This would
be nonsense, of course, just like the FTPL.
5.4 The FTPL when the money stock is exogenous:
sometimes I feel like an identity, sometimes I don￿ t
Problems of overdeterminacy are present when the government ￿xes the
sequence of nominal money stocks, as in equation (16). With the non-
16An alternative would be to ￿x only one element of the in￿nite consumption sequence
and to use the ￿rst-order conditions for a household optimum to derive the others and the
sequence of real money balances.
33Ricardian FFMP and Vt = 1; t ￿ 1; the period t price level is determined
from the period t GIBC in equation (43) alone.
Stepping away from our log-linear utility function, consider the case where
the demand for real money balances is independent of the nominal interest
rate, say, because it is derived from a simple Lucas-Stokey cash-in-advance
constraint:
Mt ￿ Ptct
= Ptct if it > i
M
t
Assume the growth rate of the nominal money stock is su¢ ciently high to
ensure that it > iM; for all t ￿ 1 (this requires 1+v > 1+iM
1+￿ ). In that case
Pt = Mt
y￿￿g ; t ￿ 1: The price level is over-determined. When the demand for
money is sensitive to the nominal interest rate, there is overdeterminacy of the
price level when the economy lasts for a ￿nite number of periods (see Buiter
[7]). With an in￿nite horizon, there is non-existence of equilibrium. This
follows from the analysis of in￿ ationary and de￿ ationary bubbles in Section
3. There can be an equilibrium only if the initial price level determined
by the GIBC happens to support the stationary state solution to (34) given
in (35). More general utility functions may weaken this stark non-existence
result somewhat.
The response of proponents of the FTPL to the overdeterminacy prob-
lem when the government sets an exogenous nominal money stock sequence
rather than an exogenous nominal interest rate sequence, is that the FTPL
34was never meant to apply to the case where the nominal money stock is
exogenous. When M is the exogenous instrument, the budget constraint
should hold identically and the ￿scal rule should be Ricardian.
But why should the details of the monetary rule determine whether the
government views its intertemporal budget constraint as an identity rather
than an equilibrium condition? If the government were to set the nominal
interest rate not exogenously but as a function of the nominal money stock
(or any other nominal variable), say it = ￿1+￿2Mt; ￿2 6= 0; the GIBC would
have to be an equilibrium condition rather than identity. If it were to set
the nominal interest rate as a function of the real money stock (or any real




2mt; the GIBC could be an equilibrium condition
and the ￿scal rule could be non-Ricardian. This ￿ ip-￿ opping of the GIBC
from being treated as an identity to being treated as an equilibrium condition,
with no justi￿cation other than that this makers the number of equilibrium
conditions equal the number of unknowns, is unacceptable methodologically.
Restrictions on individual behavioural relationships should not be based on
system-wide or general-equilibrium considerations.
5.5 A negative price level, anyone?
Consider the nominal interest rate rule (17) for which, under the CTPL , that
is, in well-posed general equilibrium models, there always is, and should be,
nominal indeterminacy. The FTPL enrols the period t general price level,
Pt; for the part played in well-posed monetary general equilibrium models
by Vtft: The GIBC determination of the price level makes sense only if the











(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ g) ￿ (1 + rt)dt￿1
￿
; t ￿ 1 (46)
In period 1; all variables in (46) other than P1 are either predetermined or
exogenous. If all debt were nominal debt, that is, (1+i1)
B0
P1 = f1, the viola-
tion of (46) would imply that either the government￿ s or the private sector￿ s
solvency constraint is violated.17 However, if dt 6= 0; we cannot use this ar-
gument to argue that (46) will be satis￿ed whenever the solvency constraints
are satis￿ed; We can have sgnfftg = sgn(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ g); which is consistent with





￿ sgnfft ￿ (1 + rt)dt￿1g 6=
sgnf(￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ g)g:
5.6 Pricing phlogiston
A startling implication of the FTPL is that it can price the numeraire, even
if the numeraire has no existence (not even a completely disembodied ex-
istence) as a good, service or pure ￿nancial claim. Pricing something that
lives a binary, disembodied existence in cyberspace need not be a problem.
However, the FTPL can price a pure numeraire: equation (43) can (sub-
17Since ft+1 ￿ (1+rt+1)ft +gt ￿￿t ￿st = (1+rt+1)ft +￿ g￿￿ ￿ under the non-Ricardian
rule, if ft > 0 and ￿ g￿￿ ￿ > 0; the proportional growth rate of the debt would exceed the real
interest rate each period, so the government solvency constraint (12) with Vt = 1;would be
violated. If ft < 0 and ￿ g ￿￿ ￿ < 0; the proportional growth rate of the stock of government
net non-monetary credit would exceed the real interest rate each period, so in equilibrium
the household￿ s solvency constraint (3) with Vt = 1; would be violated.
36ject to (46)) price the numeraire, (whatever it is that Bt is denominated
in) even if money (in the sense of a transactions medium, medium of ex-
change, most liquid store of value or whatever) not only plays no unique role
in the economy, but does not exist. In an earlier paper on the subject [7],
I called this pure numeraire phlogiston, after the imaginary substance that,
before the ascent of modern science, was believed to be responsible for com-
bustion. Such a non-existing, purely imaginary substance makes a perfectly
acceptable numeraire. Any two commodities priced in phlogiston will have
a well-determined relative price. Determining the price of phlogiston itself
when phlogiston does not exist except as a word, is an intellectual bridge too
far (for a contrary view, see Cochrane [15]).
5.7 No FTPL for Keynesians, New or Old
The price level cannot be determined by the GIBC in the manner proposed
by the FTPL, if the price level is predetermined, that is, inherited from the
past, as it is in both Old-Keynesian and New-Keynesian models. Equation
(40) provides an example of a New/Old - Keynesian Phillips curve with a
pre-determined price level. The real interest rate need not be constant and
equal to the time preference rate when output is demand-determined, so
the overdeterminacy of the FTPL equilibrium when the price level is not
instantaneously ￿ exible cannot be determined just from the GIBC itself.
Indeterminacy is, however, present.
375.8 Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is not the FTPL
One of the most important contributions of the past 40 years to monetary
theory as a branch of intertemporal public ￿nance has been the "Unpleasant
Monetarist Arithmetic" (UMA) paper of Sargent and Wallace [35]. Needless
to say, this paper is not an example of the FTPL at work but instead consti-
tutes an elegant example of the CTPL. The UMA paper analyses a Ricardian
FFMP with contract ful￿llment (Vt = 1): There is only index-linked debt,
so Bt = 0; t ￿ 0: Ignoring trend growth for simplicity, real public spending
and real taxes are constant: gt = g; ￿t = ￿; t ￿ 1: There is a regime
switch in period t1 > 1: From period 1 till period t1 ￿ 1; the authorities
￿x the growth rate of the nominal money stock at some exogenous level v:
Index-linked public debt is issued or retired in whatever amount is required
to satisfy the period budget identities of the government from period 1 till
t1: In period t1; the government stabilises the real stock of non-monetary
public debt, that is, dt = dt1; t ￿ t1: The growth rate of the nominal money
stock for all periods t ￿ t1 adjusts endogenously to a constant value that just
satis￿es the GIBC. The UMA framework implies a ￿scal theory of in￿ ation:
in￿ ation is a monetary phenomenon, but monetary growth is, through the
GIBC and the Ricardian FFMP, a budgetary or ￿scal phenomenon.
6 The vanishing monetary base
There is no reason to believe that the ￿nancial instruments currently making
up base money, currency and commercial bank balances with the central bank
will be around forever, or even for very much longer (see e.g. [19] and [20]).
38The legal domestic uses of a currency are e⁄ectively con￿ned to low value
retail transactions. The poor, who tend not to have access to formal sector
￿nancial intermediaries, use currency disproportionately. The currencies of
some major countries (especially the US dollar) are also used as stores of
value and media of exchange in countries with unstable domestic currencies
and histories of high or hyperin￿ ation. An estimate by Federal Reserve
Board sta⁄suggests that ￿As much as two-thirds of all Federal Reserve notes
in circulation -perhaps $250 to $300 billion are now held abroad￿([1], p.1;
see also [16] , [33], [34] and [17]). Apart from this, the only signi￿cant
demand for currency, especially for the larger denominations, comes from the
grey, black and outright criminal sectors of the economy. The anonymity
of the holder of currency - the same feature that makes it di¢ cult to pay
interest on currency - makes it attractive to all those engaged in criminal
activity, from evading taxes on legitimately earned incomes or evading VAT
for services provided by small contractors, to knowingly paying for criminally
obtained goods and services, investing the proceeds from criminal activity
and ￿nancing terrorism.18
There are increasingly attractive alternatives to currency for legitimate
retail transactions, from centralised electronic means of payment like debit
cards to decentralised ones like the ￿ cash on a chip￿and other forms of e-
money. In developed countries, the only domestic demand for currency will
soon come just from the poor and from those engaged in illegal activity (in-
18In the US, no Federal Reserve notes with denominations over $100 are issued, although
there is still an oustanding stock of $500 and $1000 notes. It is regrettable, from a law
enforcement point of view, that the ECB decided to issue e500 notes, as there are few if
any legitimate and legal uses for such large denomination notes.
39cluding terrorism). If a way can be found to enable the poor to have access to
the convenience of e-money, there is an overwhelming law enforcement and
national security case for doing away with legal tender currency issued by the
state. Coins and small denomination currency notes could be exempted, for
social and shopping convenience reasons. If the current prohibition on the
private issuance of currency (negotiable bearer bank notes) were removed, we
would probably see the re-emergence of private currencies, which ￿ ourished
in the UK and the USA before the state granted itself a legal monopoly on
negotiable bearer notes. Such private notes would still be popular means of
payment and stores of value for the criminal community. From the perspec-
tive of law enforcement, an end to state-issued currency and the continuation
of the ban on private negotiable bearer notes would have to be viewed as a
package. An end to state-issued currency plus a continuation of the ban on
private note issuance, enforced with appropriate sanctions, would therefore
be preferable. Drehmann, Goodhart and Krueger [17] have argued "...that
any attempt to force a complete shift to electronic transfer, and to try to ban,
or to prevent, the domestic use of cash would be appallingly illiberal". 19 If it
were to be e⁄ective, that might be a price worth paying.
As regards commercial bank balances with the central bank, the details of
the instrument should be distinguished from the services (the bundle of char-
acteristics like liquidity and security) that the central bank provides to the
commercial banks. Ignoring legally required reserves (a clumsy way of taxing
deposit taking if the interest rate on the reserves is below the market rate),
the demand for balances with the central bank derives from the unquestioned
19The quote is from the abstract of [17].
40liquidity of that instrument. Ultimately, that superior liquidity derives from
the unquestioned security and creditworthiness of the central bank, as agent
of the state. That security and creditworthiness derives partly from the legal
tender nature of the central bank￿ s monetary liabilities. More fundamentally,
it derives from the fact that the central bank is an agent of the state, the sov-
ereign, and that behind the central bank stand the Treasury with its power
to tax and other government agencies with the power to regulate, that is, to
prescribe and proscribe behaviour. The monopoly of the legitimate use of
force (or coercion) is what makes the state unique. The central bank trades
on that.
Assume both state-issued currency and banks￿balances with the central
bank have disappeared. The answer to the question: "will the state then lose
control of short-term risk-free nominal interest rates?" is the same as to the
question: "will the state cease to be more creditworthy than private agents?"
That answer is ￿ no￿ . Clearly there are some states (mainly poor, highly
indebted and encumbered with bad economic and political institutions) that
are signi￿cantly less creditworthy than some very wealthy individuals and
large and ￿nancially sound private enterprises. The ability to issue domestic
base money at will is not very helpful when there is a shortage not of domestic
liquidity but of foreign (hard) currency. There are also limits to the amount
of domestic real resources that can be extracted through the issuance of base
money especially when the capacity for in￿ icting in￿ ation surprises on holders
of base money and nominal government bonds is exhausted. The capacity
to tax is subject to economic, administrative and political constraints. All
this is true, yet it remains a fact that the creditworthiness of large and rich
41sovereign states is better than that of any private agent.20
The liquidity and security that the central bank as monetary agent of
the state can provide through its liabilities is therefore unique - but there
are many instrument(s) - existing or imagined - through which these two
characteristics can be provided. A more e¢ cient interbank market will deal
e⁄ectively with the liquidity shortfalls of individual banks and other ￿nancial
institutions. It cannot address a system-wide liquidity crunch. More e¢ cient
gross, net or mixed settlement systems, made possible by progress in high-
speed digital computing and in other areas of ICT, including the use of
intelligent arti￿cial agents in settlement systems, will continue to increase
the technical e¢ ciency of private clearing, payment and settlement systems.
But while the ￿nancial system has become more e¢ cient, technically and
economically in normal times, it has become more fragile and vulnerable in
abnormal times - when bu⁄eted by large adverse, systemic shocks.
The desirability of access to state (or state-backed) liquidity for key ￿nan-
cial intermediaries will never go away. Deposits with the central bank may
be replaced by overdraft facilities, lines of credit or other contingent claims on
the resources of the central bank. The securities that provide the necessary
liquidity may well turn out to be complex options that are o⁄-balance sheet
for both the central bank and the private intermediaries. Conventionally
measured M0 could be zero, yet there could be a su¢ ciently stable demand
20I share the view, expressed in McCallum ([30]), that the number of currencies is likely
to continue to decline relative to the number of sovereign states. Many small sovereign
nations have brittle and doubtful ￿scal-￿nancial viability. In addition, the economies of
scale inherent in the provision of a stable currency with reliable and e⁄ective clearing and
settlement systems will, in the not too distant future, leave room for at best a handful of
viable currencies.
42for contingent credit claims on the central bank for the monetary authority
to be able to set short term interest rates.21 Time will tell.
7 What is an independent central bank inde-
pendent of?
I have almost come to the end of this lecture, but monetary and ￿scal policy
remain inextricably intertwined. There are no separate monetary, ￿scal and
public debt management authorities, just a ￿ government￿that does it all.
In practice, the consolidated monetary and ￿scal authority of this lecture is
broken down institutionally at least into a Central Bank and a Treasury, or
Ministry of Finance. For simplicity, consider FFMPs with contract ful￿llment
only (Vt ￿ 1; t ￿ 1): Index-linked debt is also omitted, so dt = 0; t ￿
1: In this closed economy, the central bank has the monetary base on the
liability side of its ￿nancial balance sheet. On the asset side it has the
stock of domestic credit which, for simplicity, is assumed to consist solely
of central bank holdings of nominal Treasury bonds Bcb: As before, private
sector holdings of Treasury debt are given by B: The real value of the tax
21The UK leads the way in shrinking the deposits with the central bank component
of M0: ￿ Cash ratio deposits￿(reserve requirements) for deposit-taking institutions have
been a mere 0.25% of eligible liabilities since 1998. The rationale for cash ratio deposits
is seigniorage only. They serve no monetary policy function. Their existence is a classic
example of a quasi-￿scal role of the central bank. Abolishing them and replacing them with
an explicit tax or user charge on deposit-taking institutions would enhance transparency
in the state budget.
In the UK, at the end of 2002, all of M0 was 3.8 percent of 2002 GDP and the change in
M0 over the year was all of 0.21 percent of GDP. Under severe de￿ ationary conditions, or
during systemic liquidity crises, however, it is not the historical magnitudes of the stock
of base money and of seigniorage that matter, but the ability of the monetary authorities
to increase it, e⁄ectively instantaneously and costlessly, by any amount.
43payments by the private sector to the Treasury is ￿p; ￿cb is the real value
of the payments made by the Central Bank to the Treasury, and h is the
real value of the transfer payments made by the Central Bank to the private
sector (￿ helicopter drops￿ ). Total taxes received by the state, that is, the
consolidated Treasury and Central Bank are ￿ ￿ ￿p ￿ h:
Equation (47) is the period budget identity of the Treasury and equation
(48) that of the Central Bank. For notational simplicity, I assume that the
Central Bank does not require any current expenditure.
Bt + B
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The solvency constraint for the Treasury, limN!1 Rt+1;N(BN+Bcb
N)=PN ￿
0 and the solvency constraint for the Central Bank (incorporating the irre-
deemability of its monetary liabilities), limN!1 Rt+1;NBcb
N=PN ￿ 0, imply
the following intertemporal budget constraints for the Treasury, equation
(49) and for the Central Bank , equation (17)).
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Typically, most or all of the equity of the Central Bank is owned by the
44Treasury. For instance, the Bank of England￿ s own capital of £14,553,000
was transferred to HM Treasury in 1946.22 The Treasury has a claim to all













The ￿nancial relationship between the Central Bank and Treasury does not,
de facto, include any form of limited liability. The Treasury stands ready
to inject capital into the Central Bank￿ s balance sheet, if this were deemed
necessary for ￿nancial stability. Central Bank independence, whatever it
means, must be consistent with complete ￿nancial dependence of the Central
Bank on the Treasury (see [9]).
Can the Central Bank implement a helicopter drop of money on its own?
It certainly can issue the money through an open market purchase of Treasury
debt But it can only perform the other half of the operation, the tax cut or
transfer payment to the private sector, if there is indeed something like h in
its arsenal. In practice, Central Banks do not act as ￿scal agents of the state
in this way. This means that Governor Mervyn King cannot send a £1000
check, drawn on the Bank of England, to every household in the nation. He
22The Federal Reserve System is an independent entity within the US Federal gov-
ernment. The stock of the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks is owned by (private)
member banks. Ownership of a certain amount of stock is, by law, a condition of mem-
bership in the System. The stock may not be sold or traded or pledged as security for a
loan; dividends are, by law, 6 percent per year. The ECB is owned by the national central
banks (NCBs) that make up the EU￿ s European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The
NCB￿ s themselves have a variety of formal ownership structures, but their balance sheets
and pro￿t and loss accounts all are e⁄ectively integral parts of the consolidated ￿nancial
accounts of the nation state to which they belong. The Bank of Japan￿ s capital is one
hundred million yen, subscribed by both the government and non-governmental persons,
in exchange for subscription certi￿cations (shares), with the government providing no less
than 55 million yen
45needs Chancellor Gordon Brown￿ s help. Gordon Brown can implement the
tax cut and borrow from the Bank of England to ￿nance it. In the Eurozone,
direct borrowing by national Treasuries from the ECB and the ESCB is not
permitted, but the same e⁄ect can be achieved by the Treasury borrowing in
the market and the Central Bank purchasing the same amount of Treasury
debt in the secondary market.
The uniquely e⁄ective demand-stimulating policy measure of a helicopter
drop of money can therefore only be implemented if the Central Bank and
the Treasury cooperate. For an independent Central Bank to be e⁄ective,
there must be good communication, cooperation and coordination with the
Treasury.
Independence is not a concept that ￿ts comfortably in the conventional
economic paradigm. In the ￿ real world￿ , that is outside economics, ￿ inde-
pendence￿means that no-one can force you to do something you don￿ t want
to do. In economics we think of behaviour as being the outcome of the
confrontation of objectives and constraints
The natural approach of an economist to the relationship between Central
Bank and Government is to view it as a Principal-Agent problem. The Prin-
cipal (the government, through the Treasury) delegates a task (determining
the value of the short nominal interest rate) to an Agent (the Central Bank).
Why such delegation occurs is an interesting issue in its own right, which
will be addressed brie￿ y below. The objectives of the Agent may not be con-
gruous with those of the Principal. While the action of the Agent (the value
of the short nominal interest rate) is observable and veri￿able, the Agent
has private information about his own objectives and about the relation-
46ship between the instrument, his own objectives and those of the Principal.
By making an e⁄ort, the Agent can be more e⁄ective in the pursuit of the
Principal￿ s objectives. The Agent dislikes making an e⁄ort.
This standard Principal-Agent approach does not, however, capture some
key features of the relationship between the Central Bank and the Treasury.
First, the Central Bank is an Agent that takes decisions by Committee.
Sibert [36], [37] has shown that the details of the rules and procedures of the
Committee matter greatly for the outcome of its deliberations (see also Sibert
and Mihov [38]). Second, the Treasury, while in the position of Principal vis-
a-vis the Central Bank, is itself an Agent for a multitude of Principals - the
electorate in a political democracy.23
In order to provide the right incentives to the Agent (the Central Bank)
to pursue the objectives of the Principal (henceforth the o¢ cial objectives),
it must be possible for the Principal to monitor the performance of the Agent
in with reference to both the ultimate o¢ cial objectives (which may not be
directly observable) and the operational or proximate o¢ cial objectives. In
the UK, both the ultimate o¢ cial target (price stability) and the operational
o¢ cial target (the symmetric 2 percent per annum CPI in￿ ation target) of
monetary policy are set by the Principal.24 The ECB has complemented
its non-operational o¢ cial ultimate target - price stability - with at least
one and possibly two operational targets set by its own Governing Council
- the annual HICP in￿ ation rate is to be ￿ close to but no higher than￿two
percent, and there is a ￿ monitoring range￿for the growth rate of a broad
23The government itself is a collection of individuals and Committees.
24The CPI used to be called the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, or HIPC.
47monetary aggregate, M3. Things are even more opaque in the US, where
the ultimate objectives of the Fed, laid down in the Federal Reserve Act 25
are maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest
rates; there are no operational targets (other than the level of the Federal
Funds rate itself). Accountability cannot exist without a veri￿able criterion
for measuring performance.
What are the private objectives of the members of the monetary pol-
icy making committees of the Central Bank and how do they in￿ uence the
conduct of monetary policy? It is possible, but not likely, that all monetary
policy makers fully internalise the o¢ cial ultimate and operational targets
set by the Principal and pursue them to best of their ability. If this is true, it
would represent a highly unusual outbreak of Platonic Guardians Syndrome.
A positive, political economy or public choice-type analysis of the making
of monetary policy is both intellectually important and practically useful for
the design of rules and incentives for monetary policy makers that optimise
the monetary policy making process from the point of view of the ultimate
Principals - the citizens of the polity.
It is di¢ cult to come up with a convincing rationale for delegating mone-
tary policy to a specialised agency of the state with a measure of operational
independence without appealing to some form of bounded rationality. The
argument that monetary policy is a technical issue requiring expertise be-
25"The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates
commensurate with the economy￿ s long run potential to increase production, so as to pro-
mote e⁄ectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates." Federal Reserve Act, Section 2A￿ Monetary Policy Objectives.
48yond the ken of the Treasury is one example. So is the argument that the
Chancellor of the Exchequer/Minister of Finance is simply to busy with non-
monetary ￿scal policy issues to be able to cope with the additional demands
of monetary management.
One common argument for an operationally independent Central Bank
that does not rely on bounded rationality is that this is a commitment de-
vice for avoiding the in￿ ation bias, familiar from Kydland and Prescott [26]
and Barro and Gordon [3], associated with opportunistic behaviour. Cen-
tral bank operational independence helps overcome the commitment prob-
lem either because the government selects ￿ conservative￿central bankers or
because opportunistic behaviour is, for whatever reason, not attractive to
the operationally independent Central Bank. The cost to the Chancellor
of taking Central Bank independence away, or for attempting to interfere
with an operationally independent Central Bank is, greater than the cost to
the Chancellor of acting opportunistically in the conduct of monetary policy
when monetary policy is made by the Treasury.
The plausibility and empirical validity of the ￿ lack of commitment leads
to in￿ ation bias￿argument have been questioned by Blinder [6]. McCallum
[28] has pointed out that even if the in￿ ation bias exists, it is incongruous to
assume that the same Government that cannot commit itself credibly to a low
in￿ ation policy, is capable of appointing a monetary policy Agent capable of
such commitment and of leaving the Agent alone The only argument that gets
close to squaring this circle is based on Balcerowicz￿ s proposition that during
(rare) periods of ￿ extraordinary politics", radical institutional changes and
reforms can be introduced that are impossible to introduce during the (much
49more common) periods of "normal politics", and are not necessarily undone
or reverse again during in the course of normal politics (Balcerowicz [2]). The
creation of an operationally independent Central Bank with a clear in￿ ation
target during such a brief window of extraordinary politics could then have
lasting e⁄ects on the conduct of monetary policy, even during periods when
the creators of the operationally independent Central Bank have reverted to
opportunistic ￿ politics as usual￿ .
8 Conclusion
Perhaps the title of this paper should have been : ￿ A Small but Important
Corner of Intertemporal Public Finance￿ . I opted to omit he word ￿ important￿
to avoid encouraging a widespread tendency to overestimate the importance
of monetary economics. The problem lies not with monetary theory. Despite
the FTPL embarrassment, this is an exciting ￿eld of intellectual enquiry that
forever raises more questions than we can hope to answer. The problem
is with monetary policy - or rather with the exaggerated perception of its
importance for economic performance. The educated general public too often
stands in awe of central bankers. Too many central bankers￿demeanor
suggests that they view themselves as but one small step removed from divine
status.
Keynes once expressed the hope that economists might someday be thought
of like dentists - that they would be regarded as a-political professionals
brought in to resolve technical problems ([24], p.332]). I would like to
see Keynes￿ s paradigm of the economist as dentist internalised by central
50bankers.
In a lecture given to celebrate the ￿ve-year jubilee of the UK in￿ ation
target, Mervyn King ([25]) gave the canonical description of what one might
call the modern, technocratic view of central banking, that is, central banking
as dentistry. His view that ￿... a successful central bank should be boring ...￿
([25], p. 14) is very much in the spirit of Keynes￿ s statement. Of course, being
boring is only a necessary, not a su¢ cient condition for being an e⁄ective,
successful central bank.
Too much survives still, especially outside the UK, of the traditional view
of central bankers as priests and of central banks as their temple. In the
priestly tradition, monetary policy is a cult whose high priests perform the
sacred rites far from the prying eyes of the non-initiates. Frequent use of
the phrase "constructive ambiguity" and regular recourse to uninterpretable
Delphic utterances characterise the way the high priests of central banking
address ordinary mortals. All this is dangerous from the perspective of e⁄ec-
tive economic management and unhealthy for political democracy. Monetary
theory is intellectually exciting - and it is a fun subject. Monetary policy
requires competent functionaries, capable of exercising in a transparent way
the limited authority delegated to them. That should be enough.
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